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Abstract 
 
Performance measures shall enhance the performance of companies by directing the attention 
of decision makers towards the achievement of organizational goals. Therefore, goal 
congruence is regarded in literature as a major factor in the quality of such measures. As 
reality is affected by many variables, in practice one has tried to achieve a high degree of goal 
congruence by incorporating an increasing number of these variables into performance 
measures. However, a goal congruent measure does not lead automatically to superior 
decisions, because decision makers’ restricted cognitive abilities can counteract the intended 
effects. This paper addresses the interplay between goal congruence and complexity of 
performance measures considering cognitively-restricted decision makers. Two types of 
decision quality are derived which allow a differentiated view on the influence of this 
interplay on decision quality and learning. The simulation experiments based on this 
differentiation provide results which allow a critical reflection on costs and benefits of goal 
congruence and the assumptions regarding the goal congruence of incentive systems.  
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 1 Introduction 
Performance measures shall ensure a high level of decision makers’ decision quality by 
directing their attention and actions towards aspects of reality which are relevant to 
organisational goals (Neely et al., 1997; Amaratunga & Baldry, 2002; Heineke, 2005). In this 
context, the literature addresses the following three areas of problems.  
The first area encompasses the congruence between performance measures and economic 
reality (e.g. Kerr, 1975; Hirst, 1981; Prendergast & Topel, 1993). There is consensus that in 
order to achieve a useful performance measure, congruence between this measure and the 
relevant parts of reality (however defined) should be as high as possible (Baker, 2002; 
Bouwens & van Lent, 2006). Since reality is affected by many variables, a large number of 
them should be incorporated into performance measurement systems. In the past years the 
compliance with this requirement resulted in increasingly complex systems: First, instead of 
using isolated measures, whole performance measurement systems are proposed and used 
(Ridgway, 1956; Eccles, 1991; Marr & Schiuma, 2003). The balanced scorecard is a 
prominent example of this trend (Kaplan & Norton, 1992 & 1996; Hoque, 2003; Bessire & 
Baker, 2005). Second, more and more information is condensed into a single measure. The 
shareholder value discussion is a recent example of this development (Stewart, 1991; Stern & 
Stewart & Chew, 1995; Rogerson, 1997; Rappaport, 1998), as measures like the economic 
value added incorporate many elements. In general, the mentioned literature accepts this 
increase in complexity of performance measurement as an inevitable side-effect of its 
improvement. 
However, the second area addresses the user of performance measures (e.g. Hopwood, 1972; 
Ittner & Larcker, 1998; Franco & Bourne, 2003). From this behavioural point of view, the 
influence of complexity on the efficiency of performance measurement is regarded as 
ambiguous. A user’s limited information-processing capabilities might counteract the 
intended positive effect of goal congruence on decision quality: The simultaneous 
presentation of many measures can cause information overload (Stocks & Harrell, 1995; 
McWhorter, 2003; Eppler & Mengis, 2004). The mentioned rise of information condensation 
increases the need for interpretation that in case of cognitively-restricted decision makers can 
lead to misinterpretation (Hopwood, 1974; Hirst, 1981; Merchant, 1990; Otley, 2003). In 
essence, according to this stream of literature, complexity in performance measurement can 
compromise decision quality considerably. 
Finally, the third area concentrates on the linkage between performance measures and 
incentive systems (e.g. Otley, 1978; Merchant, 1990; Neely et al., 1997; Bouwens & van 
Lent, 2006). This aspect is mainly addressed in the agency-theoretical literature (e.g. Baimann 
& Demski, 1980; Lambert & Larcker, 1987; Feltham & Xie, 1994; Araya & Fellingham & 
Schroeder, 2004; Ewert, 2006), which virtually ignores the effect of complexity. This neglect 
- 2 - is reasonable with respect to rational decision makers, who are free of cognitive restrictions. 
In contrast, in case of cognitively-restricted decision makers complexity affects the usefulness 
of performance measures, and therefore it might also become an important obstacle to the 
effectiveness of incentive systems that are linked to these measures.  
In summary, a high degree of goal congruence is accepted as important to achieve effective 
performance measures. Yet, goal congruence is accompanied to a certain degree by 
complexity, which in turn might counteract the positive effects of goal congruence due to 
decision makers’ cognitive restrictions. On the one hand, as the discussion of the literature 
with respect to the second area of problems exhibits, this tension has already been analysed, 
yet from a rather static point of view. Decision makers are engaged in long-term decision 
processes using the same performance measures repeatedly. This fact raises the question, how 
the tension between goal congruence and complexity might influence decision makers’ 
learning and the improvement of their decision quality over time. On the other hand, as the 
discussion of the literature regarding the third area of problems shows, the influence of the 
mentioned tension on the long-term effectiveness of incentive systems linked to performance 
measures needs further analysis with special emphasis on cognitively-restricted decision 
makers. This paper picks up both aspects and analyses the influence of the mentioned tension 
on decision quality from a long-term perspective. It makes several contributions to the 
literature.  
First, it adds to the body of research concerning goal congruence a more differentiated picture 
regarding the influence of complexity by dividing the notion of decision quality into overall 
and internal quality. The former mirrors the quality of the measure regarding the actual aim. 
The latter exhibits the quality with respect to a target set with the same measure, i.e. the 
internal quality comprises what incentive systems in practice actually reward for. The 
following study shows that the interplay between goal congruence and complexity exerts 
different  effects on each. This is an important result to the practice of performance 
measurement, because firms actually implement incentive systems to achieve goal congruent 
behaviour, assuming that internal decision quality reflects overall decision quality. Yet, as the 
results point out, this may not be the case. Hence, firms do not value the actual performance 
of their decision makers properly. Additionally, this result also is important to theory as it 
contradicts in a sense the notion spread in agency-theoretical literature that the more goal 
congruent a measure is, the better its effectiveness with respect to incentive systems (Baker, 
2000 & 2002; Bouwens & van Lent, 2006). 
Second, by analysing internal decision quality, the paper further contributes to the literature 
on incentive systems. It shows that under the premise of cognitive restrictions, targets 
calculated on the basis of complex measures become more different to achieve in the short-
run. This may have discouraging effects. Hence, the possibility to become familiar with the 
measure over longer periods of time becomes crucial when highly complex measures are 
- 3 - used. Depending on the situational context, this leads to the following conclusion: in less 
dynamical decision situations, long learning phases should be provided to the user of such 
measures before linking them to incentive systems. In dynamical environments with 
constantly changing requirements, incentive systems should only be linked to less complex 
measures.  
Third, by studying overall decision quality the paper extends the body of research on 
performance measures and cognitive restrictions by adding a long-term perspective. The 
analysis shows that increasing complexity somewhat counteracts the positive effects of 
improving goal congruence and also inhibits full learning about reality in the long-run, even 
in the presence of a fully goal congruent performance measure. This outcome points to the 
question of efficient resource allocation when using complex performance measures: The 
results underline the importance of thorough cost-benefit analysis of the usefulness of more 
goal congruent measures. So far, the analyses comparing marginal benefits to marginal costs 
are relatively scarce when discussing new, presumably improved performance measurement 
systems. 
Fourth, the situation analysed in this paper is analytically intractable due to the combination 
of multi-periodicity and cognitive restrictions. Therefore, computer-based simulation is used, 
as it has been applied successfully in many areas to examine learning processes, especially 
over longer periods of time (e.g. Herriott & Levinthal & March, 1985; March, 1991; Carley, 
1992; Lant & Mezias, 1992; Marengo, 1992; Bell, 2001; Luna, 2002; Raghu & Sen & Rao, 
2003). However, in the area of accounting research this method has been used relatively 
seldom so far. Hence, the following study delivers one possible starting point for a more 
intense usage of this method in the research of performance measurement and of other 
management accounting topics.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, five idealised performance 
measures are constructed, laying the basis of the analysis. Section 3 develops the multi-
periodical decision model, in which the idealised performance measures are used. The study 
combines the premise of cognitive restrictions with experiential learning. However, in order 
to achieve a thorough analysis regarding the tension between goal congruence and 
complexity, the study has to be based on rather narrow assumptions regarding the mentioned 
psychological aspects. In Section 4 the decision model is transferred into a computer model 
and the used parameter values are presented. Section 5 distinguishes internal from overall 
decision quality and describes the metrics to evaluate both types. Moreover, it contains the 
simulation results. Section 6 is dedicated to the interpretation of the results and their 
consequences. Section 7 addresses the possibilities for future research.  
 
 
- 4 - 2  Operationalisation of five idealised performance measures 
A performance measure shall induce a decision maker to adjust his/her activities to meet a 
specific organisational goal. Nevertheless, a performance measure is only a standardised 
reflection of those parts of reality which are connected to this goal. The more relevant parts 
the measure incorporates, the higher its degree of goal congruence. The previous section 
mentioned a possible connection between goal congruence and complexity of a performance 
measure. However, increasing complexity does not necessarily lead to increasing goal 
congruence, because complex measures might also include parts of reality that are irrelevant 
to the organisational goal. In this case the possible negative or positive effects of complexity 
are mixed with effects of this mismatch. To pursue a clear analysis, one has therefore to 
construct the studied performance measures in a way ensuring that increasing complexity is 
caused by the integration of – and only of – relevant parts of reality. Then, the degree of 
complexity also reflects the degree of goal congruence and the tension between both can be 
studied properly. In effect, an object’s degree of complexity is determined by its different 
characteristics (Stocks & Harrell, 1995; Heineke, 2005). This comprises the number of 
different characteristics (quantitative complexity) and their functional heterogeneity 
(qualitative complexity). In order to keep the analysis clear, this paper focuses on the first 
aspect of complexity. For the purpose of this analysis the number of parts integrated in a 
performance measure constitutes a useful operationalisation of its degree of complexity.   
In order to be comparable, the analysed performance measures should be constructed on the 
same basis. Since value-based performance measures (Stewart, 1991; Stern & Stewart & 
Chew, 1995; Rogerson, 1997; Rappaport, 1998) have attracted a great deal of attention and 
are still discussed in accounting literature and widely used in practice, it is reasonable to use a 
stylised form of them as a starting point to derive measures of different complexity. The 
following study will be based on a stylised form of the economic value added (cf. Figure 1), 
as this measure is one of the most established ones in this field.  
 
EVA
1 = NOPAT – Invested capital x WACC,  
NOPAT = Net Operating Profit After Tax, but before financing costs 
WACC = iborrowed resources x BR + (irisk-free + (imarket – irisk-free) x beta) x CR  
i = interest rate 
BR = borrowed resources 
CR = capital resources 
beta = measure of systematic risk of the valued investment alternative 
Figure 1: The economic value added as example of a value based performance measure (Source: Stern & 
Stewart, 1995, 
1EVA is a trademark of Stern Stewart & Co.) 
 
Starting from this formula a step-wise simplification can be conducted, resulting in simpler 
but also economically reasonable measures. This way one ends up with five idealised 
- 5 - performance measures. In practice, the economic value added only comprises approximations 
of those parts of reality that are important to achieve a goal congruent measure. However, for 
the purpose of this paper the stylised form of the economic value added used in this analysis 
shall be defined as perfect reflection of the organisational goal. Consequently, those measures 
that are constructed by diminishing the degree of complexity starting at this measure also 
exhibit lower goal congruence. The resulting five measures are presented in order of 
increasing complexity to show how they build on each other. 
In the following analysis, the simplest, most reasonable measure to judge investment 
alternatives is their turnover (T) shown in (2.1), as it can give a good idea about their value 
creating potential. Because performance measure 1 consists of only one element, it has the 
complexity degree 1.  
PM1 =  T            (2.1) 
However, in most cases, it is reasonable to consider the costs of an investment alternative. 
Hence, the second measure incorporates additionally operating costs (C), i.e. in this case the 
degree of complexity is 2 and the measure is calculated via (2.2). 
PM2  =  T  –  C           (2.2)   
Besides the operating costs, costs of capital influence the value creating potential of 
investment alternatives. Therefore, the third measure considers these costs, i.e. capital (I) 
times the interest rate (i). This measure is calculated via formula (2.3) and its degree of 
complexity equals 4.  
PM3 = T – C – I * i                  (2.3) 
Because equity and debt might carry different costs of capital, one can introduce another 
measure that differentiates between these two types of capital.  Hence, performance measure 4 
is constructed by differentiating the interest rate for debt (id) from the rate of equity (ie), and 
therefore also incorporates two types of capital invested, resulting either from debt (Id) or  
from equity (Ie). Its degree of complexity is 6 and it is calculated with formula (2.4). 
PM4 = T – C – Id * id – Ie * ie        (2.4)   
Finally, performance measure 5 is based on the idea of the Capital Asset Pricing Model and 
exhibits a stylised form of the economic value added. It incorporates the risk-free interest rate 
(irf), the market interest rate (im), and a measure of the investment risk beta (β). The measure 
has a complexity degree of 8 and is calculated via (2.5). 
PM5 = T – C – Id * id – Ie * (irf + (im – irf) * β))      (2.5)   
3 Decision  model 
3.1  Cognitive restrictions and experiential learning  
Human information-processing exhibits many restrictions which affect the perception, 
interpretation, storing and retrieving of information, the amount of available knowledge, and 
- 6 - the ability to draw reasonable conclusions. In the following analysis it is unnecessary – and in 
fact impossible – to consider all of them, and the underlying psychological mechanisms will 
not be discussed in detail. In contrast, the discussion focuses on a typical situation with which 
a decision maker is faced in practice when using performance measures as decision basis and 
where cognitive restrictions in combination with learning processes come into play. As the 
general concept of experiential learning is accepted in management literature and serves as the 
basis of many models used in the context of learning in and of organisations (e.g. Cyert & 
March, 1963; March & Olson, 1975; Holmqvist, 2004), it also can be seen as reasonable 
modelling approach for the purpose of this paper. 
Typically, decision makers have to make their decisions under conditions of uncertainty. In 
“classical” decision theory this uncertainty is given as an exogenous phenomenon that is 
independent of the decision maker. However, the precision of forecasts regarding future 
events not only depends on environmental uncertainty but also on the decision maker’s 
experience (March & Simon, 1958; March & Olsen, 1975). An experienced decision maker is 
able to narrow the space of possible future states and thereby considerably improve the 
quality of his/her prognosis. Consequently, uncertainty in a decision context should be 
regarded as the result of external (environmental) and personal (cognitive) factors. Learning 
influences the personal factors and can reduce that part of uncertainty that is caused by them 
(George & Jones, 2005): After a decision a decision maker often receives feedback which 
tells her/him whether or not the prognosis was correct. When s/he is faced with a similar 
decision in the future, s/he can incorporate this feedback into the decision process and thereby 
improve the quality of his/her prognosis.  
This experiential learning cycle exhibits a rather simplistic description of human learning 
processes and their interplay with cognitive restrictions. Yet, it includes the major principles 
of learning and grounds on results of the psychological learning literature (Kolb, 1984; Bower 
& Hilgard, 1998; Purdy et al., 2001). It has to be stressed that the concept of learning on 
which the following analysis is based does not say that learning has to be positive from the 
organisational point of view. Learning is rather conceptualised as an ongoing processing of 
feedback information to adapt actions to environmental requirements. This adaptation can 
result in productive and in non-productive behaviour from an organisational point of view.  
3.2  Decision scenario  
In this section the performance measures and a cognitively-restricted decision maker are put 
into a decision context. The analysis focuses on five decision makers who independently have 
to repeat an investment decision over several periods of time. Each decision maker has the 
same starting conditions, except for the used performance measure.  
The decision makers act in a stable environment (i.e. the “true” values of the investment 
alternatives do not change from period to period). This assumption is certainly unrealistic, 
because in reality seldom several investment alternatives keep their values over a longer 
- 7 - period of time. However, this premise is necessary to explore the effect caused only by the 
interplay between cognitive restrictions and different degrees of complexity, ignoring any 
effects due to changes in other factors. Hence, the decision makers do not face external 
uncertainty. 
At the beginning of each period, each decision maker has to choose an investment alternative 
from a given set of projects. The selection is based on the values of the assigned performance 
measure that s/he has to calculate for each alternative. Each decision maker is motivated to 
select that alternative which exhibits the highest value with respect to his/her performance 
measure in use, i.e. in order to concentrate on the learning aspect the model abstracts from any 
diverging goals between the organisation and the decision makers. It shall be assumed that 
their degree of utility is linked to an incentive system based on the used performance measure. 
Hence, they are motivated to orientate their decision on their performance measures. In order 
to perform the calculation in the first period, the decision makers have to estimate 
(independently of each other) the values of those data (turnover, operating costs, etc.), which 
they need for their performance measure. Due to their lack of previous experience this 
estimation is erroneous. Consequently, although the environment is stable, the decision 
makers cannot foresee the correct values of the investment projects. Their cognitive 
restrictions lead to internal uncertainty.  
At the end of each period, the selected project ends. (Since each investment project has a 
duration of one period, one can ignore the effects of compounded interest. Moreover, no 
budgeting constraints are considered, i.e. each project is assumed to lie within an acceptable 
range with respect to given resource constraints.) Each decision maker now receives the 
correct data of the chosen alternative. S/he uses these newly received data in period n to 
recalculate the respective performance measure for the selection in period n+1. Therefore, 
s/he should improve her/him set of data concerning the alternatives and learn over time which 
investment will yield the highest value concerning the used performance measure, but this 
learning process evolves stepwise:  
In period 1, each decision maker has only estimated data based on forecasts regarding all N 
investment alternatives. Because s/he can only select and implement one alternative in each 
period, s/he also will only receive the correct data for this selected alternative at the end of 
period 1. The data sets of the other N-1 alternatives remain unchanged, i.e. they continue to 
contain only the – possibly false – estimated data. In period 2, each decision maker again has 
to calculate the expected values of all N alternatives using his/her performance measure. The 
previously chosen alternative is valued correctly, while the valuation of the other alternatives 
is still based on the estimated data. Again, on the basis of these values s/he selects one 
alternative. This can lead to a decision in which the same alternative as in period 1 is selected. 
It may also lead to the selection of another alternative. After the choice, s/he will receive the 
- 8 - correct information for the chosen alternative and so on. In effect, each decision maker only 
gets the correct information for those alternatives which s/he actually has chosen at least once.  
Although, this multi-step process is rather simplistic, it is adequate for the purpose of the 
following analysis for two reasons. First, it contains the experiential learning cycle. Second, it 
mirrors decision processes in reality in one important aspect: In most instances decision 
makers only receive feedback about the alternatives which they actually have implemented. 
4  Procedure of the simulation and parameter values  
4.1  Simulation as explorative method 
Computer-based simulations combine theoretical and empirical approaches and are located 
between deduction and induction (Axelrod, 1997): They start with a set of assumptions like 
theoretical models, but do not lead to proofs of theorems. In contrast, they aim at generating 
data sets which can be analysed inductively, similar to empirical data. Simulations have the 
advantage of internal and statistical validity (Raghu & Sen & Rao, 2003). However, since the 
data does not come from the real world, the testing of hypotheses similar to empirical research 
is not possible. Therefore, the question of external validity is often raised, and results of 
simulation experiments cannot be used directly to predict and explain real world phenomena. 
Too many variables and factors are excluded from these models. Yet, this abstraction process 
also is beneficial (Simon, 1990; Miller et al., 1992; Raghu & Sen & Rao, 2003), because it 
allows for the exploration and discovery of stylised mechanisms which could not be handled 
by analytical means, like multi-periodical learning processes in an uncertain environment. 
Therefore, simulations are best characterised as thought experiments (Simon, 1981; Axelrod, 
1997) linking theoretical and empirical research (Simon, 1990; Raghu & Sen & Rao, 2003).  
Simulation-based research can use a wide range of different techniques and methodologies in 
order to fulfil different purposes (Gilbert & Troitzsch, 2005). With respect to the analysis of 
learning processes in an economic context especially two important applications can be 
identified: On the one hand, simulations are used to analyse the dynamics of interactional 
learning processes, which evolve in groups or whole organisations (e.g. like Dupouët & 
Yıldızoğlu, 2006). This category is termed a descriptive use of simulation models (Chattoe, 
1996). On the other hand, simulations are used as substitute for an analytical analysis to 
generate comparative outcomes under different parametric settings (e.g. like Raghu & Sen & 
Rao, 2003). This type of application is also called instrumental (Chattoe, 1996). As the 
deduction of the decision situation in Section 3.2 shows, the focus of this paper lies in the 
learning processes of individual decision makers using a specific performance measure under 
the premise of internal uncertainty. In order to focus clearly on this aspect, the following 
study abstracts from interactional processes. Hence, the simulation model serves the second 
purpose. 
 
- 9 - 4.2  Step 1: Generation of investment alternatives  
The simulation is written in Java and structured according the previously developed decision 
scenario. In order to conduct a thorough analysis of the decision quality, full information 
concerning the investment alternatives is needed. Therefore, the study is not based on real 
world investment alternatives, but on a generated set of them. Each simulation run consists of 
three main steps: (1) the generation of investment alternatives, (2) the generation of decision 
makers and their estimated information sets and (3) the repeated choice by the decision 
makers based on their performance measures and personal information. This section is 
dedicated to the first step and the next one to the second and third steps. Appendix I.1 exhibits 
a pseudo-code containing the major elements of the simulation model and Appendix I.2 
provides an exemplary simulation run. 
At the beginning of each simulation run, N investment alternatives are generated. Each 
investment alternative gets a set of data which contains all information that is relevant to the 
five performance measures. Since it probably takes more time to learn about a set of two 
alternatives than it does to learn about a set of ten, it is reasonable to assume that simulation 
results will vary according to the number of investment alternatives. Therefore, the simulation 
experiments have been repeated with a varying number N of alternatives, where the results of 
N ∈ {2, 5, 10} are presented in this paper. Since the initial information sets are randomly 
generated, each experiment was repeated 2000 times to obtain a significant sample on which 
statistically-based conclusions can be drawn.   
Two aspects must be considered when generating the data sets for the decision alternatives. 
First, they should remain within a reasonable range, which makes a thorough analysis 
possible. Second, during each simulation run a differing set should be generated to protect the 
analysis from being biased by a specific constellation of data. Therefore, the simulation 
experiments are based on investment alternatives whose data are discrete uniformly 
distributed random variables drawn from the following intervals or have the following fixed 
values (sId denotes the estimated share that Id comprises of I. Consequently, Ie equals (1- 
sId)*I. Id and Ie are calculated this way to ensure comparability between PM3, PM4 and PM5):  
C ∈ {150; 199};     T ∈ {250; 349};     I ∈ {400; 499};     sId ∈ [0; 1];  
β ~ N(1; 0.05
2);       i, id = 0.08;             ie, im = 0.12;           irf  = 0.03. 
The randomly-generated values of turnover, operating costs, etc. ensure a variability of the 
initial data sets. The uniform distribution has been selected to avoid any bias. The values of 
the interest rates have been fixed, because they have only a very small impact on the learning 
process: Since they are the same when calculating with the same performance measure, their 
correct values are unveiled to the decision maker at the end of the first period.   
Table 1 provides statistical information concerning the values of the investment alternatives 
with respect to the five performance measures. It shows the spread of an average alternative 
- 10 - set, given by the average values of the five performance measures with respect to the best 
(maximum) and the worst (minimum) investment alternatives. Moreover, standard deviation, 
kurtosis, and skewness of the sample data are given.  
In addition, the column RD1 in Table 1 shows that the assumption of the relation between 
degree of complexity and degree of goal reflection underlying the construction of the five 
performance measures holds in the assumed decision context. By definition PM5 is the 
performance measure that best reflects reality in sense of goal congruence. To judge the 
degree of goal reflection regarding the other four measures, RD1 is used. It is calculated as the 
relative difference between the correct value of the best alternative b in period t concerning 
PMk and the correct value of the best alternative b in period t concerning PM5, i.e.: 
RD1(t) = |PMk,b – PM5,b|/PM5,b     ( k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5})    (4.1) 
It was assumed that the less complex the measure, the farer away it is from a correct reflection 
of the goal because fewer factors that influence the goal are taken into consideration. As 
Table 1 shows, the sample data exhibit this decrease of RD1 from PM1 to PM5. Consequently, 
the assumed increase of goal reflection with increasing complexity from PM1 to PM5 holds in 
the simulation experiments. Hence, the start assumption of this study is correctly implemented 
in the simulation model. 
 
0.47 0.03 13.95 22.37 -0.36 -0.15 13.56 119.24 0.00 0.00 PM5
0.38 -0.04 14.92 31.04 -0.26 -0.25 14.77 127.72 5.12 7.21 PM4
0.50 0.04 13.75 40.54 -0.39 -0.18 13.40 137.04 2.46 15.16 PM3
0.53 0.05 13.62 76.63 -0.40 -0.19 13.27 172.93 6.92 45.72 PM2
1.61 3.31 8.24 258.44 -1.45 2.80 8.22 340.19 31.81 188.80 PM1
10
0.39 -0.08 18.72 32.89 -0.40 -0.20 18.29 108.72 0.00 0.00 PM5
0.34 -0.10 19.57 41.78 -0.33 -0.19 19.08 117.48 5.96 8.35 PM4
0.40 -0.11 18.57 51.07 -0.41 -0.18 18.21 126.63 3.86 17.04 PM3
0.40 -0.16 18.47 87.26 -0.44 -0.15 18.16 162.54 11.11 51.22 PM2
1.13 0.99 14.10 266.05 -1.15 1.12 14.12 332.72 50.76 214.23 PM1
5
0.29 -0.39 26.71 53.23 -0.27 -0.39 26.09 90.56 0.00 0.00 PM5
0.30 -0.35 27.26 62.07 -0.22 -0.42 26.65 99.29 15.19 11.20 PM4
0.30 -0.40 26.63 71.32 -0.28 -0.39 25.93 108.45 19.83 22.66 PM3
0.31 -0.42 26.52 107.41 -0.29 -0.39 25.84 144.31 60.19 68.06 PM2
0.50 -0.68 23.67 284.05 -0.57 -0.48 22.54 316.71 264.86 288.77 PM1
2
Skewness Kurtosis Std. dev. Mean Skewness Kurtosis Std.dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean PM No. Altern.
Minimum Maximum RD1
 
Table 1:  Descriptive statistics regarding the sets of investment alternatives underlying the decision makers’ 
selection (RD1 in %). 
 
4.3  Steps 2 and 3: Construction of decision makers and repeated decisions  
In the second step of each simulation run, five decision makers are constructed. Each gets one 
of the five performance measures and receives a set of data relevant to his/her performance 
- 11 - measure for each investment alternative. To implement the internal uncertainty, these data 
sets are only estimations of the correct data that were generated previously. This estimation is 
implemented by a normally-distributed random variable which has the correct value of the 
considered piece of data as mean µ and the standard deviation σ  = 0.2*µ, i.e. on average each 
decision maker estimates each piece of data correctly. However, the single estimated pieces of 
data deviate on average from the correct value by ±20% of this value and follow a normal 
distribution.   
Because the assumption regarding this initial estimation error can be assumed to be a crucial 
one, higher and lower estimation errors were also used in the testing phase of the simulation. 
Although the absolute values of the simulation results changed, the qualitative outcomes did 
not (see Appendix II). Since the analysis uses the simulation as a “thought-experiment”, it 
does not aim at quantitative but at exactly these qualitative aspects. Hence, the following 
results are robust with respect to the changes of the estimation error. 
The third step of each simulation run comprises the repeated decision processes. As described 
in the previous section, each decision maker evaluates the N alternatives based on his/her 
personal set of estimated data and selects the alternative, which accordingly exhibits the 
highest value. At the end of the period the decision makers get the correct information 
regarding the selected alternatives to update their data sets. Based on this adjusted information 
set they perform their selection at the beginning of the next period and so on. The following 
sections provide the results regarding a time frame of 12 periods. The discussion of the 
simulation outcomes can concentrate on this time frame, because decision quality does not 
change any more thereafter.  
5  Simulation results  
5.1  Evaluation of decision quality and of learning 
In order to analyse the impact of the five performance measures on long-term decision 
quality, one has to define a measure of this quality and the degree of learning.  
Under the premise of cognitive restrictions, one can compare decisions based on performance 
measures of different degrees of complexity (a) regarding their deviation from a globally 
optimal decision and (b) regarding their deviation from the optimal decision using the same 
performance measure.  
The first aspect focuses on the decision quality and learning with respect to “reality”. This 
type of quality actually reflects the intended effect of performance measures: Performance 
measures are used to support managers and direct their decisions to select alternatives that are 
optimal for organisational goals. Consequently, the closer the “real” value of the selected 
decision alternative to the “real” value of the overall optimal alternative is, the better the 
decision in terms of goal achievement. A high-quality decision leads to a difference of zero 
between the mentioned values because the selected alternative is actually the optimal 
- 12 - alternative. This type of decision quality shall be named the overall quality and the mentioned 
difference the overall deviation. It is operationalised via the relative deviation (RD2) between 
the correct value of the (via PMk) selected alternative s in period t concerning PM5 and the 
correct value of the best alternative b in period t concerning PM5:  
RD2(t) = |PM5,s – PM5,b|/PM5,b          (5.1)   
The value of PM5 is an adequate basis of comparison, because according to the initial 
assumption it is a perfect reflection of reality. One can illustrate the meaning of (5.1) by the 
following example: A decision maker uses PM2 to evaluate the performance of the N 
alternatives. Based on this measure, s/he selects alternative s. However, in order to judge the 
“true” value of s in terms of perfect goal congruence, one has to calculate its value using PM5, 
as it perfectly reflects “reality”, and then take the difference between this value and the PM5-
value of the truly optimal alternative b. To make several simulation runs with differing 
starting values comparable, one finally calculates the relative deviation, by dividing the 
mentioned difference by the PM5-value of the truly optimal alternative b.  
The second aspect is important for analysing decision quality and learning concerning only 
the pieces of data that are relevant for the considered performance measure. In practice, 
decision makers only learn ex post the realised values of the performance measure in use. 
They never learn the “true” real value (whatever this may be) of their decisions. 
Consequently, their actual performance is always compared to benchmarks which are 
calculated in the same way as their performance targets. From this perspective, a high-quality 
decision leads to the selection of those alternatives whose correct performance values are the 
highest regarding the performance measure in use. This type of decision quality shall be 
called internal quality and the difference between the values of the – in this sense – optimal 
alternative and the selected alternative shall be named internal deviation. In case of correctly 
estimated data, this difference is always zero. However, if erroneous data are incorporated 
into the performance measure, the evaluation of decision alternatives is erroneous, too, and a 
sub-optimal alternative might be chosen. The internal deviation is calculated as the relative 
difference (RD3) between the correct value of PMk regarding the selected alternative s in 
period t and the correct value of PMk regarding the best alternative (in terms of PMk) b in 
period t: 
 RD3(t) = |PMk,s – PMk,b|/PMk,b     (k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5})    (5.2) 
In order to judge the influence of the performance measures on learning, the analysis 
concentrates on the difference between the overall internal deviation of the first and the last 
periods. If this difference is positive, the analysed performance measure allows for an 
improvement in decision quality. In this case, the learning process was favourable also from 
an organisational point of view. In case of a negative difference, the performance measure 
leads to a decrease in decision quality, what is unfavourable from an organisational 
- 13 - perspective. Beside this long-term change in decision quality, the following tables also 
provide the short term change from the first to the second period.  
5.2  Development of internal decision quality  
Figure 2 and Table 2 provide the results of the development of internal decision quality. 
Figure 2 shows the average values of RD3 in each period for each performance measure. The 
lines between the data points have been introduced for reasons of visualisation. Table 2 
presents the averaged values of RD3 of the first and the last periods, strength of short- and 
long-term learning, and some statistics regarding the sample data.  
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Figure 2: Values of RD3 in % (average of 2000 simulation runs, N = number of alternatives). 
 
- 14 - Last period RD3
No. Altern. PM Mean Std.dev. Skewness Mean Std. dev. Skewness long-term short-term
PM1 *** 2.95 5.34 1.89 *** 1.72 4.13 2.70 1.23 0.53
PM2 *** 7.48 12.90 1.78 *** 4.23 9.82 2.60 3.25 1.62
PM3 *** 10.19 17.54 1.77 *** 5.71 13.54 2.72 4.48 2.37
PM4 *** 11.24 19.43 1.79 *** 6.33 15.09 2.75 4.91 2.52
PM5 12.64 21.83 1.77 7.06 16.92 2.80 5.58 2.93
PM1 *** 5.42 6.54 1.18 *** 1.97 3.78 2.35 3.45 0.18
PM2 *** 13.50 15.51 1.02 *** 4.76 8.99 2.19 8.74 0.49
PM3 *** 17.49 20.01 1.03 *** 6.11 11.54 2.17 11.38 0.89
PM4 *** 18.95 21.89 1.07 *** 6.55 12.44 2.19 12.40 0.92
PM5 20.67 23.70 1.03 7.20 13.52 2.16 13.47 1.02
PM1 *** 5.56 6.11 1.11 *** 1.44 2.63 2.36 4.12 -1.19
PM2 *** 14.12 14.23 0.96 *** 3.69 6.50 2.07 10.43 -3.67
PM3 *** 17.95 17.91 0.92 *** 4.73 8.24 2.05 13.22 -4.35
PM4 *** 19.41 19.45 0.96 *** 5.07 8.83 2.03 14.34 -4.66
PM5 20.99 21.03 0.94 5.44 9.44 1.98 15.55 -4.41
First period RD3
2
5
strength of learning 
10
 
Table 2: Values of RD3  in the first and the last period  and strength of learning (in %). The data is tested 
regarding a significant difference to the performance measure with next higher RD3 using a Wilcoxon-Test 
because the values are not statistically independent due to their partially equal starting sets of information parts 
and they are not normally distributed. (*** significant in 99%-Interval.)   
 
Before looking at the long-run influence of the tension between goal congruence and 
complexity, the degrees of internal decision quality regarding the five measures in the first 
period (which is equivalent to a single periodical decision situation) are worth noting. 
Independently of the number of alternatives, the five performance measures start on average 
at different levels of internal deviation. Each measure starts at a significantly higher level than 
the measure with the next lower degree of complexity and goal congruence. In effect, 
increasing complexity leads to lower internal decision quality in the first period, i.e. the 
impact of cognitive restrictions increases compared to a measure with a lower level of 
complexity. Hence, the simulation experiments provide an expected outcome with respect to 
the influence of complexity in the short-run: As was discussed in Section 1, in the literature 
the effect of complexity on decision quality has been discussed from such a short-run point of 
view and the existing results point to its dysfunctional effect on decision quality. The fact that 
the simulation provides results that are in line with existing literature can be seen as evidence 
of the usefulness of the incorporated assumptions.  
With respect to the research question, the following two aspects can be observed: First, on 
average the degree of long-term learning is the highest with respect to PM5, because it 
exhibits the highest decrease of RD3 from period 1 to period 12. From PM5 to PM1 the degree 
of long-term learning diminishes. Hence, as the results regarding the first period show, the 
increasing complexity negatively influences the internal decision quality. However, through 
the process of learning the decision makers have the possibility to considerably improve their 
degree of internal decision quality over time. Moreover, the degree of complexity does not 
inhibit learning in the same manner as it influences the degree of decision quality in the first 
period. In contrast, the worse the initial internal decision quality is due to complexity, the 
higher the degree of learning. So in essence, it holds: 
- 15 - Proposition 1: Increasing complexity does not counteract the improvement of 
internal decision quality through learning in the long-term.  
However, second, with respect to the long-term development of internal decision quality, on 
average one observes that the order regarding the measures remains the same through all 
twelve periods: PM5 shows the highest degree of deviation, followed by PM4, PM3 and then 
PM2, while PM1 exhibits by far the lowest degree of internal deviation. Hence: 
Proposition 2: Increasing complexity has a negative effect on the long-term level 
of internal decision quality.  
Beside the two previously derived aspects the number of decision alternatives also has an 
effect. However, it affects all performance measures equally and therefore does not change 
the qualitative results. In essence, with an increasing number of alternatives the possibility to 
subsequently choose wrong alternatives emerges, which in the short-run can lead to an 
increase in internal deviation.  
5.3  Development of overall decision quality  
Figure 3 and Table 3 provide the results of the development of overall decision quality. Figure 
3 shows the average values of RD2 in each period for each performance measure. The lines 
between the data points have been introduced for the sake of visualisation. Table 3 presents 
the average values of RD2 of the first and the last periods, strength of short- and long-term 
learning, and some statistics about the sample data.  
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Figure 3: Values of RD2 in % (average of 2000 simulation runs, N = number of alternatives). 
 
First period RD2 Last period RD2
No. Altern. PM Mean Std.dev. Skewness Mean Std. dev. Skewness long-term short-term
PM1 n 12.90 22.20 1.80 *** 8.69 18.06 2.39 4.21 1.81
PM2 n 12.58 21.55 1.76 ** 7.31 16.87 2.69 5.27 2.56
PM3 n 12.57 21.65 1.78 n 7.11 16.88 2.78 5.46 2.84
PM4 12.48 21.60 1.78 n 7.07 16.90 2.77 5.40 2.7
PM5 n 12.64 21.83 1.77 7.06 16.92 2.80 5.58 2.93
PM1 n 21.10 23.41 1.00 *** 10.55 15.55 1.70 10.55 0.59
PM2 n 20.60 23.53 1.00 *** 7.44 13.65 2.13 13.16 0.84
PM3 n 20.55 23.51 1.04 n 7.22 13.51 2.14 13.33 1.07
PM4 20.51 23.60 1.04 7.10 13.40 2.17 13.40 1.03
PM5 n 20.67 23.70 1.03 n 7.20 13.52 2.16 13.47 1.02
PM1 *** 22.06 20.97 0.86 *** 9.99 12.32 1.23 12.07 -3.46
PM2 20.66 20.77 0.95 *** 5.60 9.58 2.06 15.06 -5.43
PM3 n 20.71 20.68 0.92 *** 5.50 9.53 2.05 15.21 -5.05
PM4 n 20.80 20.77 0.93 n 5.45 9.51 2.06 15.34 -4.97
PM5 n 20.99 21.03 0.94 5.44 9.44 1.98 15.55 -4.41
2
5
strength of learning 
10
 
Table 3: Values of RD2 in the first and the last periods and strength of learning (in %). (The data is tested 
regarding a significant difference to the performance measure with next lower RD2 using a Wilcoxon-Test 
because the values are not statistically independent due to their partially equal starting sets of information parts 
and they are not normally distributed. *** significant in 99%-Interval, ** significant in 95%-Interval, n = no 
significance.) 
 
- 17 - First, on average in case of N ∈ {2, 5} all decision makers start at about the same level of 
overall deviation, in case of N = 10, only PM1 exhibits a significantly higher deviation, i.e. its 
initial overall decision quality is lower than the initial overall decision quality of PM2 to PM5. 
Hence, although measures with higher degree of complexity also have a higher degree of goal 
congruence, there is virtually no significant difference of decision quality in the initial period 
(which is equivalent to a single periodical decision situation). The increasing number of 
possibly wrong estimated input data due to cognitive restrictions counteracts the positive 
effect of increasing goal congruence. Again, the results can be seen to be in line with the 
findings of the literature mentioned in Section 1. In addition to the outcomes regarding the 
internal decision quality, the results presented in this section are based on the combined effect 
of complexity and goal congruence, as it is also analysed in the literature regarding 
information overload. Again, the fact that the provided results are in line with the findings of 
the mentioned literature can be interpreted as evidence of the usefulness of the assumptions.   
With respect to the research question the following two observations are of special interest: 
First, independently of the number of decision alternatives, on average the final level of 
overall deviation is significantly lower for PM2 compared to PM1 and for PM2 compared to 
PM3. In case of N=10, there is also a significant difference between PM3 and PM4. However, 
there is no significant difference between PM3 and PM4 and between PM4 and PM5 in case of 
N ∈ {2, 5}, and no significant difference between PM4 and PM5 in case of N=10. Moreover, 
in terms of the absolute values of RD2, the five measures exhibit a less differentiated 
behaviour than in case of the internal deviation. Consequently, from PM2 on increasing goal 
congruence hardly leads to any improvement of overall long-term decision quality through 
learning. The negative effects of complexity counteract the positive effects of increasing goal 
congruence. This can be summed up in Proposition 3: 
Proposition 3: Increasing complexity counteracts the positive effects of 
increasing goal congruence regarding the improvement of overall decision 
quality through learning.  
Second, on average none of the performance measures allow to gain full information about 
the relevant reality, i.e. none reaches an overall deviation of zero, independently of the 
number of alternatives. Obviously, the decision makers do not get the chance to try each 
alternative and therefore in some cases repeatedly misjudge some alternatives. This result can 
be explained as follows. In each period the decision maker chooses the alternative that has the 
best value concerning his/her performance measure. Incorrectly estimated input data leads to 
situations in which actually good alternatives are undervalued and therefore never get the 
chance to be used and re-valued with the correct data. This result can be expressed in 
Proposition 4: 
- 18 - Proposition 4: Even a fully goal congruent performance measure does not reduce 
the overall deviation to zero over time in case of cognitively-restricted decision 
makers.  
Beside the mentioned effects, again the number of alternatives influences the outcomes but 
does not change the qualitative results, as it affects all performance measures equally.  
6  Interpretation of the results and implications 
6.1  Costs and benefits of goal congruence 
Taking into consideration the usual caveat regarding the generalisability of results obtained by 
simulation experiments, the previous propositions nevertheless provide some useful insights 
and may help to put some aspects regarding the influence of performance measures on 
organisational (long-term) performance partly into a new and broader perspective. In this 
section the consequences of overall decision quality are discussed in more detail. The next 
section describes the consequences of the findings regarding internal decision quality for the 
usage of incentive systems. 
As previously stated, overall decision quality is directly linked to organisational performance 
by means of goal congruence and goal achievement. It shows how close the decision maker 
comes to an overall best decision. The benchmark of this decision quality lies outside the 
organisation; it is determined by environmental factors. However, in practice overall decision 
quality never can be measured, for environmental complexity undermines the possibility to 
find any “truly correct measure” as metric for the achievement of organisational goals. Any 
measure can only be an approximation. The better this approximation, the more goal-relevant 
parts have to be incorporated and – on average – the more complex a measure becomes. The 
possible dysfunctional effects that can arise when decision makers with restricted 
information-processing capabilities are confronted with complex performance measurement 
systems have been discussed and accepted in literature. However, the focus of this discussion 
was put on a relatively short-term perspective. The simulation results add to this by taking the 
discussion one step further. They point to the fact that even learning cannot eradicate these 
dysfunctional effects, as Propositions 4 shows: Performance measures with higher degree of 
goal congruence exhibit the least overall deviation in the final period, but there is no 
significant improvement from PM3 to PM5 respectively from PM4 to PM5. The incorporation 
of more pieces of information is not equivalent to an improvement of overall decision quality 
in the long-run, as cognitive restrictions may lead to continuous distortion of measures that 
are actually goal congruent. The mentioned long-term aspect is of importance, as in many 
instances in practice and in theory the implicit assumption can be observed, according which 
initial problems of performance measurement systems will disappear after some learning 
phase. In this sense, the repeated use of a more goal congruent measure always should allow a 
decision maker to learn more about “reality” than a less goal congruent measure, at least in 
- 19 - the long-run. However, as the simulation results indicate, under the assumption of 
cognitively-restricted decision makers, this might not be the case. One has to consider 
additionally, that the study has focused only on a single aspect of cognitive restrictions. 
Problems in perception and interpretation, which were ignored in this paper, would probably 
exacerbate the dysfunctional effects. The mentioned aspects have implications for theory and 
practice. 
With respect to the practice of performance measurement the following can be concluded: 
Decision makers in firms are frequently confronted with new performance measurement 
systems, not only as users but in their capacity to decide whether or not to implement them. 
One major reason for the implementation of new performance measurement systems is 
certainly the inadequacy of existing systems (Ittner & Larcker, 1998). However, new trends in 
performance measurement are often aggressively marketed by consulting firms. The pressure 
to pick up such new developments is additionally increased when competitors have already 
implemented such systems and may benefit from improved management processes. The sole 
conjecture that any improvements could be gained from the new system by competitors can 
similarly enhance a decision to implement the system. Hence, the actual need for new 
measurement systems that better fit to a changing environmental context in combination with 
pressure to implement new “managerial fashions” have led firms to introduce a wide range of 
highly complex performance measurement systems without previously testing to see whether 
they actually fit. For example, recent empirical studies show, that the additional informational 
value of the economic value added to classical accounting data is marginal (Tsuji, 2006; 
Kyriais & Anastassis, 2007). Yet, due to its complex calculation modus and the high amount 
of data needed, presumably its expense compared to that of classical accounting information 
is considerable.  
In essence, as complexity raises the costs of gathering, selecting, saving and distributing the 
needed data, one should have a closer look at the actual quality improvement through 
increasing goal congruence. This is particularly important as the used stylised performance 
measures are quite simplistic compared to the actual performance measures used in practice. 
In particular, the past and current discussions of value-based performance measures and of the 
balanced scorecard highlight the need to gather a high number of information parts and to 
apply many adjustments to them before arriving at an adequate measure. These processes 
consume many resources, but their additional benefit remains vague. The results of this study 
point to the supposition, that in some situations a less goal congruent but easier to process 
measure would produce the same degree of overall decision quality. However, since it is 
simpler, its calculation consumes fewer resources. Therefore, it leads to the same benefit but 
at lower cost and therefore has a better impact on organisational performance than a more 
goal congruent one, in the short-run and in the long-run.  
- 20 - From a theoretical point of view, one should start to analyse the influence of specific 
performance measurement systems on long-term learning of single decision makers in order 
to judge their value compared to more classical performance measures as decision basis. 
Surely, the analysis of the information value of general information systems has a long 
standing tradition in accounting theory. However, it tackles the problem from a relative 
abstract point of view. In contrast, only the combined consideration of cognitive restrictions 
and the characteristics of a specific performance measurement system allow for its judgment 
in a practically useful way. Additionally, the mentioned learning aspect should be taken more 
prominently into consideration, as performance measures are one of the most important 
information systems that are used – mainly in an unconscious way – by decision makers to 
learn about environmental requirements. 
6.2  Incentive systems and goal congruence 
What organisations actually want to achieve is highly goal congruent behaviour of their 
decision makers. This is equivalent to decisions with high degree of overall decision quality. 
Yet, organisations reward internal decision quality: Often performance measures and 
incentive systems are linked insofar as incentives are bound to target values regarding these 
measures, which should be reached by decision makers. However, this is exactly what internal 
decision quality means. It reflects how well a decision maker adapts his/her decisions to a 
decision that is optimal to the performance measure in use. Consequently, by using incentive 
systems, decision makers are motivated to improve the internal quality of decisions. Hence, in 
practice one assumes that using a highly goal congruent measure and by rewarding internal 
decision quality a high degree of overall decision quality is achieved and thereby, the decision 
maker’s and the organisational performance improve. Actually, if this assumption holds, the 
order of the five performance measures should be the same in their internal and overall 
decision quality. However, as the simulation results show, at least under the used 
assumptions, this is not the case: the higher the degree of complexity, the lower internal 
decision quality, as Proposition 2 shows.  
Translated to the practice of incentive systems, this means the higher the degree of 
complexity, the harder it might be to match the preset target value of the used performance in 
the short-run and in the long-run. Hence, on the one hand, using highly goal congruent 
measures aligns decisions to organisational goals by providing a relatively high degree of 
overall decision quality. On the other hand, this is not valued by incentive systems, since due 
to their high degree of complexity, highly goal congruent measures also have a relatively low 
degree of internal decision quality. The impossibility of matching given targets negatively 
affects the motivation of decision makers and can reduce their interest in meeting 
organisational goals. The motivational effect of incentive systems is counteracted by the de-
motivational effect of their sensitivity to errors caused by cognitive restrictions. 
- 21 - Consequently, the actual aim of motivating decision makers to pursue the correct action fails. 
The incentive system becomes less effective.  
This casts the theoretical discussion regarding distorted performance measures in the 
literature into a new light. There is a considerable body of research on the influence of 
distorted performance measures on the effectiveness of incentive systems (e.g. Feltham & 
Xie, 1994; Baker, 2000 & 2002; Bouwens & van Lent, 2006). In this stream of literature, 
distortion is synonymous with what this paper has called overall deviation. The authors come 
to the conclusion, that the less distorted a measure is, the more effective is its application in 
incentive systems. However, as the previous analysis demonstrates, when cognitive 
restrictions come into play, this notion might not hold. In the simulation study only the 
missing experience to perform a reasonable forecast, was considered. In practice, cognitive 
restrictions might also lead to misperception of the perceived data, wrong interpretations etc., 
which can additionally increase the mentioned effect. In effect, similar to environmental 
factors cognitive restrictions introduce noise into performance measurement processes. In 
literature, noise and distortion are discussed as affecting the quality of incentive systems in 
the same manner (e.g. Baker, 2002). Additionally, some authors accept them as two 
phenomena that are linked to each other in a reverse manner (e.g. Baker, 2002). The 
simulation study adds to this discussion one possible reason for this trade-off and exhibits its 
long-term consequences.   
With respect to practical consequences, especially Proposition 1 is of interest. It exhibits a 
positive effect of goal congruence on the improvement of decision quality over time. This 
leads to two further conclusions on the linkage of more or less goal congruent and therefore 
complex performance measures to incentive systems under the premise of learning.  
First, the more complex a measure gets, the more important it becomes for the decision maker 
to improve his decisions over time, because the more complex a measure is, the higher is the 
probable deviation between a preset target value and the reached value when it is used for the 
first time. Therefore, it is recommended to use highly complex measures only in relatively 
stable decision situations where the circumstances change slightly over time and the decision 
maker has time to learn. Moreover, in order to prevent from de-motivational effects, a 
learning phase should be provided, in which the measure is not yet linked to any incentive 
systems. In more dynamic environments, less complex measures are more useful. They may 
have a lower degree of goal congruence. However, as the environment changes constantly, the 
decision maker has not sufficient time to learn and the negative effects of complexity would 
counteract the positive effects of goal congruence. 
Second, it would make sense to have a closer look at this learning perspective instead of pure 
goal reaching, when linking incentives to more complex performance measures, i.e. especially 
for highly complex measures incentives probably could be linked to improvements from 
period to period instead to pure target reaching. Alternatively, one can think of a more 
- 22 - differentiated performance measurement system incorporating more and less complex 
measures: the former are used for learning purposes only, the latter are linked to incentive 
systems. However, this dichotomy would probably be hard to communicate. 
7  Conclusion and further research 
This paper studies the interplay between goal congruence and complexity of performance 
measures and its influence on decision quality and learning. The results of this study add 
several aspects to the existing literature. First, the modelling process showed that there are 
two kinds of decision quality, which have to be studied separately from each other to reach a 
better understanding regarding the influence of performance measures on decision makers’ 
learning. Overall decision quality reflects what organisations actually want to achieve when 
they implement performance measures. It comprises the degree of “real” goal achievement. 
The higher the degree of overall decision quality is, the closer the outcome of a decision 
comes to the outcome of an overall best decision. Internal decision quality reflects what 
organisations actually measure and reward their decision makers for. It mirrors the quality of 
a decision under a given set of assumptions about reality that are incorporated in the used 
performance measurement system. Second, the simulation experiments exhibited that 
complexity which to a certain degree always accompanies goal congruence, differently 
influences both types of decision quality. This aspect is important to the practical use of 
performance measures, as that use is based on the implicit assumption that both kinds of 
decision quality are linked to each other and by rewarding internal decision quality one will 
also achieve overall decision quality. As this seems not to be the case, the question regarding 
costs and benefits of an increasing number of presumably more goal congruent but also more 
complex modern performance measurement systems rises. Third, the study points to the 
influence of performance measures on decision makers’ learning processes and highlights the 
importance of further research in this area. As was stated in Section 3.1, learning comprises a 
process of adaptation to environmental requirements through the perception and interpretation 
of feedback information. Performance measurement systems are one of the most important 
feedback systems in organisations. They cast decision makers’ learning processes regarding 
“reality” in a strong way, and have the potential to lead to outcomes that are unfavourable 
from an organisation’s point of view.    
The analysis was conducted in the context of restrictive premises. Therefore, at this point it 
shall be stressed that the study was done explicitly under the premise of exploration and its 
results are a starting point for further research. Beside the already mentioned aspects, the 
simulation experiments reveal the following promising research directions.  
First, as stated in Section 6, in practice the inquiry of the different pieces of a complex 
performance measure consumes resources and thereby results in expense. The more parts a 
measure has, the more resources it needs. So far this resource consumption was only 
- 23 - mentioned but not introduced in the simulation model. It would be interesting to analyse on 
the basis of a simulation model the trade-off between the expense incurred by the number of 
information parts and their additional informational value – measured as a decrease of overall 
deviation. Since those costs of inquiry can be considerable, one may assume that the 
incorporation of this trade-off in the presented model would be worthwhile.  
Second, this study is based on a rather simple decision situation. The decision maker has to 
repeat his selection of investment alternatives several times, while there are no changes in the 
alternatives. This was conducted to isolate the influence of complexity on personal 
uncertainty, ignoring external uncertainty caused by changing investment alternatives. 
However, because in practice decision makers have to cope with both types of uncertainty, the 
external one should be introduced in a future model. Moreover, errors of perception and 
interpretation when receiving the feedback might be valuable to introduce in a future model as 
additional aspects of cognitive restriction. 
Finally, the simulation results show that under the given premises, the ranking of the five 
analysed performance measures is quite different in both types of decision quality. As 
mentioned in Section 6, incentive systems assume that both types of decision quality go in the 
same direction. Consequently, a deeper analysis of the linkage between internal and overall 
decision quality would be of interest. 
- 24 - Appendix I: Simulation  
A I.1 Pseudo-code 
Regarding the five performance measures, the following algorithm was performed during one 
simulation run (k = number of alternatives, j = index of performance measure (j ∈ {1,…,5}), 
nj = index of pieces of information (nj ∈ {1,…,Nj,}, Nj = number of pieces of information 
needed for calculating performance measure j): 
(1) Generate sets of k vectors vi,j (i ∈ {1, …, k}) that contain the correct pieces of 
information for the respective alternative i and the performance measure j.  
Those pieces of information that are used for several performance measures are the 
same regarding the respective alternative. 
(2) Based on these values generate the vectors  i,j containing the estimated values of the 
pieces of information adding an error term εi,j
(nj) ~ N(0, (0.2*vi,j
(nj))
2). 
v 
Those parts of information that are used for several performance measures get the 
same initial misjudgement regarding the respective alternative. 
(3) For (1 to 12)  /* The simulation comprises 12 periods. */  
{ 
For  (m  =  1  to  5)  /* The decision makers calculate the values of the 
alternatives based on their performance measure. */ 
{  
Calculate the values of the decision alternatives based on the set of 
estimated values  i,j
(nj)  using formulas (2.m).  v 
Chose the alternative with the highest performance value. 
} 
For (m = 1 to 5)  /* The decision makers receive the correct values for the 
selected alternative lm and recalibrate their information 
set. */ 
{Substitute the values in the vector  lm,m by the correct values v lm,m.}  v 
} 
- 25 - A I.2 Example 
The following example shows a simulation run in which the decision makers have to choose 
between two decision alternatives. 
Step 1: Generation of the information sets regarding the decision alternatives 1 and 2 
    Alternative 1: T1=270; C1=151; I1= 420; sIb=0.5; β1=1.05; i, ib=0.08; ie, im=0.12; irf =0.03 
    Alternative 2: T2=300; C2=187; I2= 460; sIb=0.5; β2=1.006; i, ib=0.08; ie, im=0.12; irf =0.03 
Step 2: Generation of the estimated information sets by the decision makers 
    (PMi
j indicates the value of performance measure i with respect to alternative j)  
Decision maker 1 using PM1: 
    Alternative 1: T’1=285, i.e. PM1
1=285 
    Alternative 2: T’2=290, i.e. PM1
2=290 
Decision maker 2 using PM2: 
    Alternative 1: T’1=285; C’1=150, i.e. PM2
1=135 
    Alternative 2: T’2=290; C’2=177, i.e. PM2
2=113 
Decision maker 3 using PM3: 
    Alternative 1: T’1=285; C’1=150; I’1=423; i’=0.08, i.e. PM3
1
 = 101.16 
    Alternative 2: T’2=290; C’2=177; I’2=457; i’=0.08, i.e. PM3
2
 = 76.44 
Etc. 
Step 3: Repeated decisions 
Period 1 
    Decision maker 1 selects alternative 2, as PM1
1 < PM1
2, and receives the correct value of     
    T2=300.  
    Decision maker 2 selects alternative 1, as PM2
1 > PM2
2, and receives the correct values of  
    T1=270; C1=151.
 
    Decision maker 3 selects alternative 1, as PM3
1 > PM3
2, and receives the correct values of  
    T1=270; C1=151; I1= 420; i=0.08.
 
    Etc. 
Period 2 
    Each agent recalculates the values of the alternatives using his performance measure and  
    selects the alternative with the highest value, and so on. 
- 26 - Appendix II: Sensitivity analysis regarding the degree of error 
Figure 4 and Table 4 show the simulation results regarding the internal deviation with varying 
errors. As the different degrees of error influence all performance measures equally, the 
qualitative results summarised in Propositions 1 to 3 remain unchanged.  
Figure 5 and Table 5 show the results concerning the overall deviation. Regarding the first 
period, a lower degree of error leads to a significant higher overall deviation of PM1 also in 
case of five decision alternatives, while in case of a high error there is no significant 
difference any more independently of the number of alternatives.  Hence, a high degree of 
error equalises decision quality in the first period between PM1 and the other performance 
measures. This aspect is consistent with Proposition 4. Moreover the differences in error also 
have an influence on the significant difference among the five performance measures in the 
last period. However, the qualitative results captured in Propositions 5 and 6 remain 
unchanged.  
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Figure 4: Values of RD3 in % (average of 2000 simulation runs, 5 alternatives, degree of error ∈ {10%, 30%}). 
 
- 27 - Last period RD3
error in % No. Altern. PM Mean Std.dev. Skewness Mean Std. dev. Skewness long-term short-term
PM1 *** 1.61 3.82 2.99 *** 0.75 2.36 3.96 0.86 0.63
PM2 *** 4.39 9.87 2.61 *** 1.91 6.07 3.95 2.48 1.67
PM3 *** 5.93 13.30 2.57 *** 2.64 8.37 3.97 3.29 2.26
PM4 *** 6.51 14.60 2.58 *** 2.90 9.25 4.05 3.60 2.47
PM5 7.39 16.62 2.58 3.40 11.00 4.20 4.00 2.70
PM1 *** 2.85 4.47 1.83 *** 1.00 2.35 2.98 1.85 0.55
PM2 *** 7.31 11.06 1.72 *** 2.29 5.38 2.92 5.03 1.66
10% PM3 *** 9.67 14.46 1.70 *** 3.03 7.05 2.93 6.64 2.14
PM4 *** 10.47 15.68 1.71 *** 3.25 7.53 2.88 7.23 2.34
PM5 11.62 17.14 1.65 3.51 8.13 2.89 8.11 2.81
PM1 *** 3.37 4.23 1.48 *** 0.93 1.86 2.52 2.43 -0.13
PM2 *** 8.58 10.40 1.33 *** 2.39 4.74 2.36 6.20 -0.36
PM3 *** 11.10 13.34 1.36 *** 2.94 5.83 2.27 8.16 -0.10
PM4 *** 11.94 14.39 1.39 *** 3.17 6.27 2.25 8.78 -0.06
PM5 12.78 15.53 1.40 3.39 6.76 2.30 9.40 -0.12
PM1 *** 3.55 6.10 1.79 *** 2.26 5.01 2.49 1.29 0.44
PM2 *** 8.73 14.64 1.70 *** 5.29 11.87 2.53 3.44 1.14
PM3 *** 12.21 19.97 1.60 *** 7.44 16.32 2.41 4.77 1.59
PM4 *** 13.50 22.02 1.61 *** 8.27 18.09 2.42 5.23 1.66
PM5 14.93 24.21 1.57 9.18 19.86 2.35 5.75 1.75
PM1 *** 6.66 7.26 0.91 *** 2.49 4.43 2.08 4.18 -0.05
PM2 *** 15.79 16.43 0.84 *** 5.99 10.31 1.99 9.80 -0.22
30% PM3 *** 20.64 21.30 0.81 *** 7.79 13.45 1.98 12.85 -0.58
PM4 *** 22.35 23.00 0.79 *** 8.37 14.45 1.98 13.99 -0.71
PM5 24.54 25.02 0.78 9.15 15.72 1.95 15.39 -0.71
PM1 *** 7.26 7.12 0.90 *** 1.75 3.10 2.34 5.51 -1.49
PM2 *** 18.85 16.44 0.66 *** 4.86 7.89 1.81 13.99 -1.79
PM3 *** 23.79 20.65 0.66 *** 6.15 9.97 1.86 17.64 -2.68
PM4 *** 25.44 22.10 0.67 *** 6.61 10.76 1.90 18.84 -3.25
PM5 27.48 23.93 0.65 7.19 11.63 1.87 20.29 -3.34
10
2
5
10
First period RD3
2
5
strength of learning 
  
Table 4: Values of RD3 in the first and the last periods and strength of learning (in %). (The data are tested 
regarding a significant difference to the performance measure with next lower RD2 using a Wilcoxon-Test 
because the values are not statistically independent due to their partially equal starting sets of information parts 
and they are not normally distributed. *** significant in 99%-Interval, ** significant in 95%-Interval, n = no 
significance.)  
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2
PM1 PM2 PM3 PM4 PM5
Period Period
10% 30%
 
Figure 5: Values of RD2 in % (average of 2000 simulation runs, 5 alternatives, degree of error ∈ {10%, 30%}).  
 
- 28 - Last period RD2
error in % No. Altern. PM Mean Std.dev. Skewness Mean Std. dev. Skewness long-term short-term
PM1 n 7.88 16.95 2.45 *** 5.20 12.92 2.99 2.67 1.66
PM2 n 7.47 16.48 2.52 n 3.46 10.67 3.88 4.00 2.59
PM3 n 7.36 16.42 2.54 n 3.33 10.54 3.96 4.03 2.73
PM4 7.35 16.38 2.53 3.30 10.50 3.99 4.05 2.78
PM5 n 7.39 16.62 2.58 n 3.40 11.00 4.20 4.00 2.70
PM1 *** 12.87 17.65 1.50 *** 6.94 11.90 2.02 5.93 2.30
PM2 11.31 16.84 1.65 ** 3.80 8.60 2.84 7.50 2.45
10% PM3 n 11.44 16.98 1.68 n 3.67 8.42 2.88 7.77 2.49
PM4 n 11.45 17.04 1.69 ** 3.62 8.31 2.87 7.83 2.52
PM5 n 11.62 17.14 1.65 3.51 8.13 2.89 8.11 2.81
PM1 *** 15.45 16.25 1.05 *** 8.67 11.07 1.21 6.77 -0.28
PM2 12.66 15.31 1.31 *** 3.65 7.13 2.33 9.00 -0.56
PM3 n 12.80 15.41 1.34 n 3.42 6.76 2.30 9.38 -0.18
PM4 n 12.84 15.45 1.35 n 3.43 6.77 2.27 9.41 -0.10
PM5 n 12.78 15.53 1.40 3.39 6.76 2.30 9.40 -0.12
PM1 n 15.22 24.50 1.61 *** 10.60 20.80 2.16 4.62 1.82
PM2 14.68 24.01 1.59 8.97 19.58 2.40 5.71 1.94
PM3 n 15.03 24.40 1.57 n 9.21 20.03 2.37 5.82 1.89
PM4 n 15.05 24.42 1.57 n 9.21 20.04 2.37 5.83 1.88
PM5 n 14.93 24.21 1.57 n 9.18 19.86 2.35 5.75 1.75
PM1 n 24.20 24.65 0.80 *** 12.01 17.17 1.56 12.20 -0.64
PM2 23.85 24.68 0.81 n 9.19 15.56 1.93 14.66 -0.37
30% PM3 n 24.15 24.87 0.80 n 9.13 15.74 1.97 15.02 -0.71
PM4 n 24.15 24.80 0.79 9.06 15.62 1.95 15.08 -0.86
PM5 n 24.54 25.02 0.78 n 9.15 15.72 1.95 15.39 -0.71
PM1 27.06 23.39 0.70 *** 11.52 13.86 1.22 15.55 -4.08
PM2 n 27.65 23.95 0.65 *** 7.33 11.60 1.78 20.31 -2.60
PM3 n 27.48 23.85 0.66 7.13 11.48 1.85 20.35 -3.12
PM4 n 27.42 23.79 0.66 n 7.15 11.55 1.87 20.28 -3.46
PM5 n 27.48 23.93 0.65 n 7.19 11.63 1.87 20.29 -3.34
First period RD2
2
5
strength of learning 
10
10
2
5
  
Table 5: Values of RD2 in the first and the last periods and strength of learning (in %). (The data are tested 
regarding a significant difference to the performance measure with next lower RD2 using a Wilcoxon-Test 
because the values are not statistically independent due to their partially equal starting sets of information parts 
and they are not normally distributed. *** significant in 99%-Interval, ** significant in 95%-Interval, n = no 
significance.) 
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